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Contract Law and the Hand Formula
Daniel P. O'Gorman*
ABSTRACT

Contract law is largely about negligence. Through the use of a
"reason to know" or "reason to believe" standard in many of the
black letter rules in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
contract liability can often be traced to a party's failure to exercise
reasonable care. The Restatement, however, fails to adequately
explain when a person has reason to know or reason to believe
something. In other words, despite being largely about careless
behavior, contract law fails to adequately explain the standard of
care expected of parties. Importantly, though, the Restatement at
least makes clear that a person might have reason to know or
reason to believe something even when a reasonable person would
believe the probability of the fact's existence (or future existence)
is less than 50%, as long as the probability is sufficiently
substantial. The Restatement does not, however, provide much
guidance on when the probability should be considered sufficiently
substantial. This Article proposes that negligence law's Hand
formula be applied to make this determination.
INTRODUCTION

Contract law is largely about negligence. 1 Through the direct
and indirect use of a "reason to know" or "reason to believe"
standard in many of the black letter rules in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, contract liability can often be traced to a
party's failure to exercise reasonable care under the
Copyright 2014, by DANIELP. O'GORMAN.
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New York University, 1993. B.A., summa cum /aude, University of Central
Florida, 1990. Thanks to Samantha Castranova, Barry Law School Class of
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1. This Article uses the word negligence in the sense of behavior that falls
below an acceptable level of care, as opposed to referring to a tort claim of
negligence. See JOHN L. DIAMOND, UNDERSTANDING TORTS 46 (5th ed. 2013)
(explaining the two different senses in which negligence is used); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (9th ed. 2009) (defining negligence as "[t]he
failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would
have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal
standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except
for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others'
rights," but also as "[a] tort grounded in this failure").
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circumstances.2 The Restatement, however, fails to adequately
explain when a person has reason to know or reason to believe
something. In other words, despite being largely about careless
behavior, contract law fails to adequately explain the standard of
care expected of parties.
This Article proposes that negligence law's Hand formula 3 be
applied in contract law to determine whether a person has "reason
to know" or "reason to believe" something. As will be shown,
using the Hand formula explains the relevance of facts traditionally
considered irrelevant under a contract-law analysis, but which
intuitively seem relevant.
Part I of this Article explains how contract law is largely about
negligence. Part II discusses the Restatement's "reason to know"
and "reason to believe" standard and shows that the Restatement
fails to adequately explain it. Part III discusses negligence law's
famous Hand formula. Part IV maintains that the Hand formula
should be used to determine when a party is negligent under
contract law's "reason to know" and "reason to believe" standard.
Part V provides examples, through the use of well-known cases, of
how the Hand formula would apply in cases involving the
standard.

I. CONTRACT LAW As A LAW OF NEGLIGENCE
Although a bargain might usually involve each party
intentionally assuming obligations, 4 contract law, like tort law, 5 is

2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2010) (providing that "[a] person acts negligently ifthe
person does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances"). "Reason
to know" would presumably apply when asking if a person had reason to know
the existence of a current or past fact. "Reason to believe" would presumably
apply when asking if a person had reason to believe that some fact would arise
in the future. The Restatement, however, creates confusion by referring to
"reason to know" of a fact, "present or future." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. b ( 1981 ). The Restatement uses the phrase "reason to
understand" in Section 69 (acceptance by silence or exercise of dominion), but it
is unclear whether such a standard differs in a meaningful way from "reason to
know" or "reason to believe." Id. § 69(1)(b).
3. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947) (setting forth a formula for determining whether a person's conduct fell
below the appropriate standard of care for purposes of determining negligence
liability in tort).
4. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 98 (I Ith ed. 2003)
(defining bargain as "an agreement between parties settling what each gives or
receives in a transaction between them or what course of action or policy each
pursues in respect to the other").
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primarily about negligence. Such an assertion might be contrary to
what is commonly assumed, 6 but a survey of contract law's black
letter rules reveals its truth.
For example, one need look no further than Section 2 of the
Restatement for confirmation that contract law is primarily about
negligence. Section 2 defines promise (the most important term in
contract law) 7 as "a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from
acting in a specified way, so made as to justi.fY. a promisee in
understanding that a commitment has been made. " 8 A comment to
Section 2 explains that the phrase "manifestation of intention" is
used to make clear that a person need not intend to make a
promise, provided she had "reason to believe" her words or actions
would be interpreted as an intention to act or refrain from acting in
a specified way. 9 Also, the promisee must be justified in
understanding that a commitment has been made. 10 A promisee
whose understanding is unjustified is at fault for having such an
understanding and, in such a situation, the communication will not
be considered a promise. Thus, the definition of promise
incorporates a fault standard that applies to both the promisor and
the promisee. 11
The word manifestation, with its "reason to believe" fault
standard, is repeated in the Restatement's definition of
agreement-"a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two

5. See DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 46 ("[N]egligence, as a form of faultbased liability ... continues to be the central basis for liability in most tort
cases.").
6. See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Lore, 27 J. CORP. L. 505, 510 (2002)
("The understood purpose of contract law is to facilitate people's freely made
private exchange transactions."); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A
THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2 (1981) ("Contract law ratifies and
enforces our joint ventures .... [T]he law of contracts facilitates our disposing
of [our] rights on terms that seem best to us."); Patrick Atiyah, Contracts,
Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 L.Q. REV. 193 (1978), reprinted in A
CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 78, 78 (Peter Linzer ed., 2d ed. 1995) (noting that
contract law is usually considered to be based on voluntarily-assumed
obligations).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (defining
contract as "a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a
duty"); see also FRIED, supra note 6, at 7-27 (arguing that contract law is
primarily about the morality of promising).
8. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 2 (1981) (emphasis added).
9. Id § 2 cmt. b.
IO. Id § 2.
11. Id (emphasis added).
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or more persons" 12-with a comment to the definition noting that
"[t]he word contains no implication of mental agreement." 13
Because an agreement is necessary for the formation of a
bargained-for exchange contract, the word manifestation is
repeated again when stating the requirements for the formation of
such a contract: "the formation of a contract requires . . .
manifestation of mutual assent." 14 A comment explains that
manifestation is used to make clear that subjective intent to enter
into a contract is unnecessary. 15 Another rule provides that "[t]he
conduct of a party may manifest assent even though he does not in
fact assent." 1
The definition of bargain also incorporates a fault standard.
The definition is "an agreement to exchange promises or to
exchange a r.romise for a performance or to exchange
performances." 7 By directly incorporating agreement and
promise, the definition of bargain indirectly incorporates both the
"reason to believe" standard and the "justify" standard. And the
Restatement further implements a fault-based regime by directly
using a "reason to know" standard (or, in one instance, "reason to
understand") 18 and by indirectly using a "reason to believe"
standard through the use of the words manifestation, manifest, or
manifested in numerous other restatements of black letter law. 19
The prevalence of contract law's use of the "reason to know"
~nd "reason to believe" standard is unsurprising because such a
standard implements the so-called objective theory of contract,
under which parties' subjective intentions are usually irrelevant
and the parties' rights and duties are determined objectivelybased on what the parties manifested. 20 As Judge Jerome Frank
famously stated, "[t]he objectivists transferred from the field of
torts [and into the field of contracts] that stubborn anti-subjectivist,
the 'reasonable man. "'21 And because of the prevalence of the
12. Id. § 3.
13. Id. § 3 cmt. a.
14. ld.§17(1).
15. Id.§ 17 cmt. c.
16. Id.§ 19(3).
17. Id. § 3.
18. Id. § 69(1)(b).
19. See, e.g., id. §§ 2(1), 3, 7, 15(l)(b), 16, 19(2), 20(1), 20(2), 21, 24, 26,
28(1), 28(2), 29, 38(1), 38(2), 39(1), 39(2), 42, 49, 50(1), 51, 53(3), 54(2), 56,
69(l)(a), 93, 94, 96, 98, 102, 103, 104, 112, 221, 248, 266.
20. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 114-17 (4th ed. 2004)
(explaining the distinction between the objective theory of contract and the
subjective theory of contract).
21. Ricketts v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
concurring).
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"reason to know" and "reason to believe" standard within contract
doctrine, it is not an overstatement to say that contract law is
primarily about sanctioning a party for negligent conduct-usually
the negligent use of language. Thus, the principal distinction
between contract law and tort law is not a distinction between
voluntarily assumed duties and externally-imposed duties; it is a
distinction based on the typical types of behavior that result in
liability and the typical types of harm caused by such behavior.
Contract law is primarily concerned with the negligent use of
language that causes economic harm, whereas tort law is primarily
concerned with negligent, non-verbal action that results in personal
injury or property damage.
Contract law's focus on fault is not limited to contract
formation. For example, the defenses for non-performance are
largely about fault. The Statute of Frauds precludes a plaintiff from
holding a defendant liable when the plaintiff failed to obtain
written confirmation of the bargain.22 The defense of mistake
excuses non-performance, but only if the mistaken party did not
manifest an intention to bear the risk of the mistake, or should not,
as a matter of law, bear the risk of the mistake. 23 In other words, if
the mistaken party led the other party to believe the mistaken part~
was assuming the risk of the mistake, the mistaken party is liable. <i
Even if the mistaken party did not lead the other party to believe
this, if the mistaken party was grossly negligent in making the
mistake, the mistaken party remains liable. 25
When a party induces another party to manifest assent by
means of a misrepresentation, the victim is given the power to void
the contract, essentially holding the misrepresenting party
responsible for making the statement without confirming its
truth. 26 But the victim cannot avoid the contract based on the
22. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS§ 110(1981).
23. Id. §§ 152, 153.
24. See id. § 154 (providing that "[a] party bears the risk of [the] mistake
when the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties"). The standard to
be applied in determining whether a party has agreed to bear the risk of the
mistake is an objective standard. See id. § 154 cmt. b ("[H]e may ... agree, by
appropriate language or other manifestations, to perform in spite of mistake that
would otherwise justify his avoidance."); id. § 3 (defining agreement as "a
manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons"); see, e.g.,
Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42 (Wis. 1885) (holding that seller of stone that
turned out to be an uncut diamond bore the risk of mistake when she told the
buyer that she did not know what the stone was).
25. Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Americana at Brand, LLC, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d
718, 729 (Ct. App. 2013).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981) ("If a
party's manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material
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misrepresentation if the victim's reliance on the misrepresentation
was unjustified. 27 This rule therefore adopts a contributory fault
standard, though the required degree of fault by the victim is quite
high. 28 When a party induces a victim's assent through duress or
undue influence, the resulting contract is voidable by the victim
holding the party responsible for improperly obtaining assent. 2 9
For a contract or one of its terms to be unenforceable under the
doctrine of unconscionability, there must be either unfair suwrise
or lack of meaningful choice resulting in oppressive terms, 30 with
the focus often on whether there has been bad behavior by one of
the parties. 31 The doctrines of impracticability and frustration of
purpose do not excuse non-performance if the non-performin:&
party's own fault made performance impracticable or pointless.
With respect to damages, a party is not liable for losses that the
non-breaching party could have avoided through reasonable
efforts. 33 Thus, contract law, like tort law, is dominated by
doctrines in which fault is an element.
Of course, an important distinction between contract law and
tort law is that ·under contract law, when one uses language
negligently and leads another to mistakenly believe a promise has
been made-which, as shown above, is just one example of a fault
standard in contract law-one can still avoid liability by
performing as promised. 34 But this does not meaningfully
distinguish contract law from tort law, because performing as
promised simply means no harm has been suffered by the
promisee, and, similarly, under tort law there is no claim without
harm. 35 The promisor who negligently makes a promise but then

misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in
relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient.").
27. See id. § 164 cmt. d.
28. See Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608, 616 (Alaska 1980) (holding
that recipient's reliance is only unjustified if it was "irrational, preposterous, or
in bad faith").
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 175, 177 (1981).
30. See generally id. § 208.
31. See id. § 208 cmt. d.
32. See id. §§ 261 (impracticability), 265 (frustration of purpose).
33. See id. § 350 (avoidable loss doctrine).
34. See JP Morgan Chase v. J.H. Elec. of N.Y, Inc., 893 N.Y.S.2d 237
(App. Div. 2010) (stating that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are
''the existence of a contract, the plaintiffs performance under the contract, the
defendant's breach of that contract, and resulting damages" (emphasis added)).
35. See Schuman v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 69 A.3d 512, 526-28 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2013) (holding that a claim in negligence requires the plaintiff to
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performs is simply a person whose conduct fell below the required
standard of care and who then took action to keep his carelessness
from causing harm.
For example, consider a grocery store that fails to mop up
rainwater that has accumulated just inside its front door on a rain~
day and that also fails to put a wet-floor sign next to the water.
The store's failure to mop up the water or display a wet-floor sign
is conduct below the required standard of care under tort law. 37 If a
patron enters the store, reaches for a shopping buggy, and slips on
the rainwater, injuring his neck and shoulders, 38 the grocery store
will be liable in tort for negligence. 39 Assume, however, that the
facts are slightly different: As the patron is falling, a grocery-store
clerk, who happens to be standing next to the shopping buggies,
catches the patron and neither the patron nor the clerk is harmed.
The grocery store, despite its negligence, is not liable in tort
because its negligence caused no harm.
Now, consider an employer who, through its president's
negligent use of language, leads one of its employees to justifiably
believe the employer and em.rcloyee have entered into a contract for
one year of re-employment. 0 If the employer fires the employee
two months later without just cause, the employer will be liable for
breach of contract. 41 These facts are not meaningfully different
from the facts in the grocery store hypothetical in which the patron
falls and is injured. Both the grocery store and the employer
engaged in behavior that fell below the acceptable standard of care,
causing harm to another person-the patron and the employee,
respectively. The only difference is that the grocery store's conduct
involved the negligent failure to mop up the water or place a wetfloor sign next to it, whereas the employer's conduct involved the
negligent use of language.
Assume, however, that the employer, after becoming aware of
its negligent use of language, retains the employee for one year. In
such a case, the employer would not be liable for breach of
contract despite its negligence because the employer performed its

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff was harmed by the
defendant's conduct, and finding that the plaintiff failed to carry that burden).
36. See, e.g., Burnett v. M & E Food Mart, Inc. # 2, 772 So. 2d 393 (La. Ct.
App. 2000).
37. See id. at 397-98.
38. Id. at 395.
39. Id. at 397-98.
40. Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1907).
41. Id.
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promise and thereby avoided causing any harm to the employee.
These facts are really no different from the altered facts in the
grocery store hypothetical. The employer retaining the employee
for the promised year is like the grocery-store clerk catching the
falling patron. No harm, no foul.
One might argue that a fundamental difference between
contract law and tort law is that contract law requires an intentional
act. In other words, one must voluntarily choose to use language
before one can be held liable for its negligent use. As noted by the
Restatement: "A 'manifestation' of assent is not a mere
appearance; the party must in some way be responsible for the
appearance .... This is true even thou§h the other party reasonably
believes that the assent is genuine." 2 But tort law usually also
requires an antecedent intentional act, even when liability
ultimately flows from a subsequent failure to act, such as the
failure to mop up the rainwater or display a wet-floor sign next to
it. One must open a grocery store and then invite patrons into the
store before being liable for not .mopping up the rainwater or
placing a wet-floor sign next to it. Similarly, one must drive a car
down the street before being liable for striking a pedestrian, and
one must perform a surgical operation on a patient before being
liable for making the patient's condition worse. As noted by the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, even though negligence can involve a
person failing to take a reasonable precaution, it is preferable to
state that the person is negligent for engaging in an activity
without taking reasonable precautions. 43
The general rule that tort law does not impose a duty to act
shows that liability generally starts with an intentional act. 44
Although exceptions to this general rule have arisen, they can be
traced to a voluntary act. For example, although real property
owners have a duty to help guests and invitees,45 one must choose
to become a real property owner and then invite the guest or
invitee onto the property. Although the law imposes a duty upon a
person to extricate another from danger if the person created the
danger, the person must engage in conduct to create the danger. 46
It might be argued, however, that in contract law a person may
intend to make a promise and then be prevented from performing
as promised for reasons beyond the promisor's control, and yet still
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 19 cmt. c (1981) (internal
citations omitted).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 cmt. c (2010).
44. La Raia v. Super. Ct., 722 P .2d 286, 289 (Ariz. 1986).
45. Id. at 290.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 322 (1965).
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be held liable. The Restatement notes: "Contract liability is strict
liability.... The obligor is therefore liable in damages for breach
of contract even if he is without fault and even if circumstances
have made the contract more burdensome . . . than he had
anticipated. " 47
Though, in such a situation, the promisor's negligence is not
the failure to perform as promised, the promisor's negligence is the
failure to have qualified the promise by the event that rendered
performance impossible or more burdensome. As noted by the
Restatement:
The obligor who does not wish to undertake so extensive an
obligation [strict liability] may contract for a lesser one by
using one of a variety of common clauses: he may agree
only to use his "best efforts"; he may restrict his obligation
to his output or requirements; he may reserve a right to
cancel the contract; he may use a flexible pricing
arrangement such as a "cost plus" term; he may insert a
force majeure clause; or he may limit his damages for
breach. 48
Also, contract liability is not truly strict liability. Under the
impracticability doctrine, a promisor who fails to perform as
promised because her performance was rendered impossible or
impracticable as a result of an unanticipated event that was not her
fault will generally only be liable if the language she used when
contracting manifested an intention to still be liable. 49 Thus,
liability (as opposed to the failure to perform) can still be traced to
the promisor's fault-having led the other party to believe that she
would perform no matter what.
The remedies under contract law and negligence law might
suggest, however, that the two areas of law are fundamentally
different. Under negligence law, the remedy is to return the
plaintiff to the status quo ante. 50 Under contract law, the remedy is
to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the
defendant performed as promised-so-called expectation damages

47. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, intro. note (1981).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 261.
50. See Daniel Markovits, Making and Keeping Contracts, 92 VA. L. REV.
1325, 1361 (2006) ("The ordinary morality of harm, embodied for example in
the law of torts, is backward-looking. The obligations it contemplates ... are
limited to preventing losses; and the remedies it recommends (for example, the
damage awards contemplated in the law of torts) are limited to the compensation
necessary to restore the status quo ante.").
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or benefit-of-the-bargain damages. 51 And this difference in
remedies cannot be ignored because the expectation-damages rule
is arguably "the distinctive hallmark of contract law." 52
But Professor Lon Fuller famously, and persuasively, argued
that contract law's standard remedy of expectation damages might
be designed to protect the promisee's reliance on the promise, with
expectation damages being awarded because reliance damages are
often hard to prove and often the same as benefit-of-the-bargain
damages. 53 Fuller explained:
[E]ven if our interest [in contract law] were confined to
protecting promisees against an out-of-pocket loss, it would
still be possible to justify the rule granting the value of the
expectancy, both as a cure for, and as a prophylaxis against,
losses of this sort.
It is a cure for these losses in the sense that it offers the
measure of recovery most likely to reimburse the plaintiff
for the (often very numerous and very difficult to prove)
individual acts and forbearances which make up his total
reliance on the contract. It [sic] we take into account "gains
prevented" by reliance, that is, losses involved in foregoing
the opportunity to enter other contracts, the notion that the
rule protecting the expectancy is adopted as the most
effective means of compensating for detrimental reliance
seems not at all far-fetched. Physicians with an extensive
practice often charge their patients the full office call fee
for broken appointments. Such a charge looks on the face
of things like a claim to the promised fee; it seems to be
based on the "expectation interest." Yet the physician
making the charge will quite justifiably regard it as
compensation for the loss of the opportunity to gain a
51. See Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 644 (N.H. 1929) (holding that the
general remedy for breach of contract is an amount of compensation designed to
put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the defendant
performed as promised, not an amount of compensation designed to put the
plaintiff in the position he was in before the promise was made); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 347 (1981) ("Subject to the limitations stated in§§
350-53, the injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest
... .");id § 344(a) (defining "expectation interest" as the plaintiff's "interest in
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract been performed").
52. PETER BENSON, THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 2, 3
(2001).
53. L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, 46 YALEL.J. 52 (1936).
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similar fee from a different patient. This foregoing of other
opportunities is involved to some extent in entering most
contracts, and the impossibility of subjecting this type of
reliance to any kind of measurement may justify a
categorical rule granting the value of the expectancy as the
most effective way of compensating for such losses. 54
Fuller also argued that the justification for contract law's
expectation-damages rule need not be limited to curing and preventing
reliance losses, but might be justified by "a policy in favor of
promoting and facilitating reliance on business agreements."55 Fuller
then explained this policy in a way fully applicable to the policy
behind negligence law:
As in the case of the stop-light ordinance we are interested
not only in preventing collisions but in speeding traffic.
Agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or
for society, unless they are made the basis for action. When
business agreements are not only made but are also acted
on, the division of labor is facilitated, goods find their way
to the places where they are most needed, and economic
activity is generally stimulated. These advantages would be
threatened by any rule which limited legal protection to the
reliance interest [i.e., damages to return the promisee to the
status quo ante]. Such a rule would in practice tend to
discourage reliance. The difficulties in proving reliance and
subjecting it to pecuniary measurement are such that the
business man knowing, or sensing, that these obstacles
stood in the way of judicial relief would hesitate to rely on
a promise in any case where the legal sanction was of
significance to him. To encourage reliance we must
therefore dispense with its proof. . . . The juristic
explanation in its final form is then twofold. It rests the
protection accorded the expectancy on ( 1) the need for
curing and preventing the harms caused by reliance, and (2)
on the need for facilitating reliance on business
agreements. 56
In other words, the expectation-damages rule is arguably based not
only on reimbursing the victim for harm caused, but also on
encouraging reliance on bargains so as to promote efficiency.

54. Id. at 60.
55. Id. at 61.
56. Id. at 61-62.
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If Fuller's suggested rationales for expectation damages are
accepted, they dissolve the apparent distinction between contractlaw remedies and tort-law remedies. Both are designed to
compensate for harm caused to the plaintiff and to encourage
persons to engage in useful activities by guaranteeing that others
with whom they come into contact while engaging in those
activities will be held liable if those others are negligent and cause
harm.
Whether contract law is primarily about fault or something
else-such as autonomy or morality-has been a matter of
contention over the past forty years. 57 But the objective theory of
contract, which has "predominated in the common law of contracts
since time immemorial,"58 and the numerous uses of the "reason to
know" and "reason to believe" standard in the black letter of
contract law, lead to the inescapable conclusion that contract law's
core is largely about fault. Professor Charles Fried's famous theory
that contract law is primarily about the morality of keeping one's
promises59 crumbles under the objective theory of contract, 60
which provides that a person can be liable even if she did not
intend to make a promise. 61 Professor Randy Barnett's similar
theory that contract law is primarily about consent62 is not really
about consent at all-as that term is commonly understoodbecause his definition of consent includes an objective standard,
referring to a "manifestation of an intention."63 Recognizing that
contract law is primarily about fault does not mean that contract
law should be assimilated into tort law, and that every contract
doctrine should be based on fault (and none based on autonomy or
morality), any more than every tort doctrine is or should be based
57. For a discussion of the different theories of contract law, see Daniel P.
O'Gorman, Contract Theory and Some Realism About Employee Covenant Not
to Compete Cases, 65 SMU L. REV. 145, 157-77 (2012).
58. Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract
Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 428 (2000).
59. See FRIED, supra note 6, at l ("The promise principle, which in this
book I argue is the moral basis of contract law, is that principle by which
persons may impose on themselves obligations where none existed before.").
60. See Atiyah, supra note 6, at 84 ("Every law student is taught from his
earliest days that contractual intent is not really what it seems; actual subjective
intent is normally irrelevant. It is the appearance, the manifestation of intent that
matters. Whenever a person is held bound by a promise or a contract contrary to
his actual intent or understanding, it is plain that the liability is based not on
some notion of voluntary assumption of obligation, but on something else.").
61. FARNSWORTH, supra note 20, at 115.
62. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 269 (1986).
63. Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
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on fault. It simply recognizes a fact: contract law, for the most part,
is about fault.
Despite contract law being primarily about fault, judges,
lawyers, and scholars still use language referring to the parties'
intentions when describing it. 64 Professor Robert Hillman has
discussed this discrepancy and argued that it is the result of
persons describing contract law as they wished it could be, rather
than as it is and must be. 65
Thus, judges, lawyers, and scholars have simply failed to accept
the hard truth that contract law is primarily--even if not
exclusively-about fault (and, in particular, about negligence). As
a result, whereas courts and scholars have devoted considerable
attention in tort law to exploring when a party will (or should) be
considered to have acted below the applicable standard of care,
courts and scholars have devoted much less attention to the same
issue in contract law. It is time to move past the debate concerning
what contract law is primarily about and recognize that it is
primarily about fault and to focus the discussion on when a party
is, in fact, at fault under contract law.
II. CONTRACT LA W'S "REASON TO KNOW" AND "REASON TO
BELIEVE" FAULT STANDARD

This Part discusses contract law's "reason to know" and
"reason to believe" fault standard. As previously discussed, this
standard is just one of the many ways in which contract law
implements a fault-based regime. The standard of care in these
other situations might be different from situation to situation,
making it inappropriate to set forth a single fault standard for all of
them. But the "reason to know" and "reason to believe" standard
seems to have been incorporated throughout many of the
Restatement's black letter rules for the very purpose of having the
same fault standard apply to each of those rules.
A. An Important Innovation by the Standard
An important innovation of the Restatement's use of the
"reason to know" and "reason to believe" standard with respect to
communications is its focus, in many of the rules incorporating it,
on what the speaker had reason to know or believe the recipient
would infer, rather than on what the recipient had reason to know
or believe. This was an innovation because courts traditionally
64.
65.

See Hillman, supra note 6, at 510-12.
Id. at 515-17 (internal citations omitted).
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phrased black letter rules regarding communications as being
based solely on what a reasonable person in the recipient's
position, or perhaps the position of a third-party observer, would
infer from the communication. 66 For example, a court in a wellknown case stated the following with respect to whether a
communication was assent to a bargain or was just a joke: "[A]
person cannot set up that he was merely jesting when his conduct
and words would warrant a reasonable person in believing that he
intended a real agreement."67 Similarly, another court stated that
determining whether an offer was made is based on "what an
objective, reasonable person would have understood."68 With
respect to whether an offeree accepted an offer, one court in
another well-known case stated that the test is whether "a
reasonable man would believe that [the offeree] was assenting to
the terms proposed by the other party. " 69
The Restatement's "reason to know" and "reason to believe"
standard often focuses on whether the speaker would have reason
to know or believe that the recipient would infer a particular
intention by the speaker. 70 Of course, when the speaker is unaware
of any characteristics of the recipient that the recipient does not
share with the typical person, the speaker is justified in believing
that the recipient does, in fact, have those characteristics. 71 In such
a situation, the speaker has reason to believe the recipient will
construe the speaker's words as a typical person would construe
them. "In that event, one can simply state the standard as how a
typical person would construe the speaker's words.
But when the speaker knows or has reason to know that the
recipient has characteristics that are different in kind or degree
from the typical person, under the Restatement's focus on the
speaker he is held to a standard based on what he has reason to
believe that particular recipient will infer from his
66. See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable
Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 332
(1997) ("The common law has generally framed its objective theory from the
perspective of the promisee." (emphasis added)).
67. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954).
68. Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
aff'd, 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
69. Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 779
(Mo. Ct. App. 1907) (quoting Smith v. Hughes, 6 L.R.Q.B. 597, 607 (1871)).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 19 cmt. b (1981).
71. Reference is made to the "typical" person because the "reasonable person" of
tort law is arguably not the typical or average person. See DIAMOND, supra note 1, at
49 & n.13 ("[T]he expected qualities of the reasonable person are not necessarily
what is the average or even what most do in the community. . .. [T]he jury can, and
probably often does, set a rather exacting standard ofreasonableness.").
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communication. In other words, if the speaker is aware that the
recipient is more gullible than the typical person, the speaker has
reason to believe that what the typical person would construe as a
joke the recipient might construe as serious. In such a situation, it
might be appropriate to hold the speaker responsible, and the
Restatement's standard would permit such a result. 72
Also, focusing solely on the perspective of a typical person in
the recipient's position would not enable the court or jury to take
into account whether the speaker had (or should have had)
knowledfoe, or has intelligence, superior to that of a typical
person. 7 Under negligence law's concept of the reasonable person,
for example, "if a person in fact has knowledge, skill, or even
intelligence superior to that of the ordinary person, the law will
demand of that person conduct consistent with it."74 Thus, to
envision a single, typical person observing the transactionwhether from the vantage of the recipient of the communication or
a third party-is to ignore the fact that whether a person is at fault
is based on the circumstances of that particular person,
circumstances that might be different from the circumstances of
the person sitting across the bargaining table or a person observing
the transaction.

B. The Restatement's Failure to Adequately Explain the Standard
Unfortunately, courts and commentators have neglected the
contours of contract law's "reason to know" and "reason to
believe" standard. Perhaps this is because it is assumed that the
standard is obvious-a person has reason to know or reason to
believe something when a reasonable or typical person in the
position of the party would believe that the fact's existence (reason
to know), or its chance of occurring (reason to believe), is more
likely than not. This would be consistent with the burden of proof
in most civil cases. As explained by one court: "[I]n most civil
cases, the lowest, ordinary burden of proof applies, requiring what
is commonly referred to as a 'preponderance of the evidence.'

72. See, e.g., THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 8 (6th ed. 2012) (Problem 2,

involving a recipient of a communication whom the speaker knew had a low
I.Q.).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. b (1981) ("A
person of superior intelligence has reason to know a fact if he has information
from which a person of his intelligence would draw the inference.").
74. w. PROSSER & w. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 185 (5th ed.
1984).
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[Under this standard], the jury must be satisfied to a reasonable
certainty by the greater weight of the credible evidence."75
Relying on the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to
conclude that contract law's "reason to know" and "reason to
believe" standard is a more-likely-than-not-standard (i.e., a greater
weight of the evidence standard) confuses, however, the quantum
of proof necessary to establish "reason to know" or "reason to
believe" with the substantive definition of "reason to know" and
"reason to believe" (i.e., the amount of knowledge required). 76 For
example, a court could hold that a person is only considered to
have reason to know a fact if a person would believe the chance of
the fact existing was 70% or more, and yet still apply a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to determine whether a
person would believe there was a 70%-or-greater chance. In other
words, evidence would have to be admitted to prove, more likely
than not, that a person in the same position would have believed
the chance of the fact existing was 70% or more. Accordingly,
recognizing that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
applies in most civil cases does not help give meaning to the
phrases "reason to know" and "reason to believe."
And neither does the phrase "reason to" provide much
guidance on the applicable standard of care. The plain meaning of
reason, as in "reason to act," is "a rational ground or motive."77
Thus, applying the plain meaning of reason to the phrases "reason
to know" and "reason to ·believe" means a "rational ground or
motive to know" and a "rational ground or motive to believe."
Rational, however, is simply defined as "having reason or
understanding."78 Thus, consul.ting the plain meaning of "reason
to" gets us nowhere.
The Restatement, in a comment, provides a brief explanation of
the "reason to know" and "reason to believe" standard. 79 Perhaps
75. Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 815 N.W.2d 314, 324 (Wis.
2012) (emphasis added).
76. See, e.g., NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401 (1983)
(holding that even though the General Counsel has the burden of persuasion by a
preponderance of the evidence, it was not improper for the NLRB to only
require a showing that the employer's anti-union animus was a factor in the
decision); Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 680 (Col. 1998) (noting, with
respect to punitive damages in employment-discrimination cases, the distinction
between "what level of [defendant's] intent must be established" and "the
quantum of proof required to establish that substantive level of intent").
77. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1037 (11th ed. 2003).
78. Id at 1032.
79. Though the Restatement, in the comment, only expressly refers to
"reason to know" and not to "reason to believe," the comment applies to both
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surprisingly, the Restatement indicates a person might have reason
to know a fact exists (or will exist) even if a person would believe
the chance of its existence (or future existence) is less than 50%, as
long as there is a substantial chance it exists (or will exist):
A person has reason to know a fact, present or future, if he
has information from which a person of ordinary
intelligence would infer that the fact in question does or
will exist. A person of superior intelligence has reason to
know a fact if he has information from which a person of
his intelligence would draw that inference. There is also
reason to know if the inference would be that there is such
a substantial chance of the existence of the fact that, if
exercising reasonable care with reference to the matter in
question, the person would predicate his action upon the
assumption of its possible existence. . . . [T]he words
"reason to know" are used . . . where the actor . . . would
not be acting adequately in the protection of his own
interests were he not acting with reference to the facts
which he has reason to know. 80
The comment states that a person has reason to know a fact when
he would infer that it does exist, and then states there might also be
reason to know where there is a substantial chance of its existence.
The fact that a 50%-or-less chance might be sufficiently
substantial is supported by the statement that there is "reason to
know" when "the actor ... would not be acting adequately in the
protection of his own interests were he not acting with reference to
the facts which he has reason to know." For example, assume a
traveler has the choice of taking two different roads (Road A and
Road B) to reach her destination, and the only difference between
the roads is that Road B's bridge crossing a river that cuts across
both roads is out of commission 20% of the time, whereas Road
A's bridge is only out of commission 10% of the time. Also,
assume that the traveler has no knowledge of whether either bridge
is currently out of commission. The traveler would not be acting

because it refers to having reason to know a fact "present or future."
19 cmt. b (1981).
80. Id. (emphasis added). A similar standard has been adopted in Black's
Law Dictionary, which defines reason to know as follows: "Information from
which a person of ordinary intelligence-or of the superior intelligence that the
person may have-would infer that the fact in question exists or that there is a
substantial enough chance of its existence that, if the person exercises
reasonable care, the person can assume the fact exists." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1381 (9th ed. 2009).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§

144

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

adequately in the protection of her own interest if she took Road B
instead of Road A, even though it is more likely than not that Road
B's bridge is working.
The Restatement comment could have, of course, easily stated
that a person has reason to know a fact exists (or will exist) when
the person has reason to know its existence (or future existence) is
more likely than not. Had such a standard been adopted, little
explanation of the standard would be necessary. Such a standard
might be difficult to apply in particular cases, but not because the
standard itself is unclear. The Restatement, however, rejected such
a standard, and instead used the vaguer "substantial chance"
standard.
Another Restatement comment makes clear that this substantial
chance standard is a negligence standard, when it states the
following:
[E]ven though the intentional conduct of a party creates an
appearance of assent on his part, he is not responsible for
that appearance unless he knows or has reason to know that
his conduct may cause the other party to understand that he
assents. In effect there must be either intentional or
negligent creation of an appearance of assent. 81
And another comment refers to the person exercising "reasonable
care. " 82 Professor Arthur Corbin similarly recognized that the
objective theory of contract was a negligence theory: "In the
process of making a contract, the actual and proved intent of either
of the parties should not be disregarded, unless he knowingly or
negligently has misled another person to his injury."83
Adopting a "substantial chance" or negligence standard instead
of a more-likely-than-not standard has the benefit of being a more
flexible standard, enabling a court or jury to reach a just result
when it might not otherwise be able to do so. The detriment,
however, is that the standard is more difficult to apply than a morelikely-than-not standard, in turn making it more difficult for parties
to predict how courts or juries will apply the standard to a given set
of facts. In this sense, the choice between "substantial chance" or
negligence and "more likely than not" is a choice between a socalled standard-a vague, flexible test-and a so-called rule-a

81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. c (1981) (emphasis
added).
82. Id § 19 cmt. b.
83. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: ONE VOLUME EDITION §
106, at 157 (1952) (emphasis added).
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bright-line test-with each having the benefits and detriments of a
standard or a rule, respectively. 84
The Restatement comment, despite adopting the "substantial
chance" or negligence standard, gives little explanation of what
constitutes a "substantial chance," simply stating thafthe chance is
sufficiently substantial when "the [reasonably careful] person
would predicate his action upon the assumption of its possible
existence"; then stating that there would be "reason to know" when
the person "would not be acting adequately in the protection of his
own interests were he not acting with reference to the facts which
he has reason to know"; and then suggesting it is a negligence
standard. 85
The Restatement's "reason to know" and "reason to believe"
standard was modeled on the "reason to know" standard in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency and the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, and the definition of "notice" in the pre-2001 version of
Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). 86 The
Restatement (Second) ofAgency explains the standard as follows:
A person has reason to know of a fact if he has information
from which a person of ordinary intelligence, or of the
superior intelligence which such person may have, would
infer that the fact in question exists or that there is such a
substantial chance of its existence that, if exercising
reasonable care with reference to the matter in question, his
action would be predicated upon the assumption of its
possible existence. The inference drawn need not be that
the fact exists; it is sufficient that the likelihood of its
existence is so great that a person of ordinary intelligence,
or of the superior intelligence which the person in question
has, would, if exercising ordinary prudence under the
circumstances, govern his conduct as if the fact existed,
until he could ascertain its existence or non-existence. The
words "reason to know" do not necessarily import the
existence of a duty to others to ascertain facts; the words
84. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976) ("There are ... two opposed
modes for dealing with questions of the form in which legal solutions to the
substantive problems should be cast. One formal mode favors the use of clearly
defined, highly administrable, general rules; the other supports the use of
equitable standards producing ad hoc decisions with relatively little precedential
value.").
85. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 19 cmt. b (1981).
86. See id (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9 (1958);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 (1965); u.c.c. § 1-201(25) (pre-2001
version)).
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are used both where the actor has a duty to another and
where he would not be acting adequately in the protection
of his own interests were he not to act with reference to the
facts which he has reason to know. One may have reason to
know a fact although he does not make the inference of its
existence which would be made by a reasonable person in
his position and with his knowledge, whether his failure to
make such inference is due to inferior intelligence or to a
failure properly to exercise such intelligence as he has. A
person of superior intelligence or training has reason to
know a fact if a person with his mental capacity and
attainments would draw such an inference from the facts
known to him. On the other hand, "reason to know"
imports no duty to ascertain facts not to be deduced as
inferences from facts already known; one has reason to
know a fact only if a reasonable person in his position
would infer such fact from other facts already known to
him. 87
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that:
The words "reason to know" are used throughout the
Restatement of this Subject to denote the fact that the actor
has information from which a person of reasonable
intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor
would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such
person would govern his conduct upon the assumption that
such fact exists. 88
Thus, neither the Restatement (Second) ofAgency nor the Restatement
(Second) of Torts provides much information beyond that provided in
the Restatement (Second) ofContracts.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency comment does make
clear, however, that a person can have "reason to know" even if he
or she does not infer that the fact exists, and that the determination
of whether a person has "reason to know" is based on the
information in the person's possession. The comments in each of
the three Restatements also vary slightly with respect to the
standard to which the person is held when the person has below
average intelligence. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts refers
to "a person of ordinary intelligence," the Restatement (Second) of
Agency refers not only to "a person of ordinary intelligence" but
also "a reasonable person," and the Restatement (Second) of Torts
87. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF AGENCY§ 9 cmt. d (1958).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 12(1) (1965).
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refers to a person of "reasonable intelligence." It does not appear
that these slightly different phrases are intended to be different
standards, but because the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
refers fo "a person of ordinary intelligence," that is the phrase that
will be used in this Article.
Unfortunately, Article 1 of the U.C.C., which· provides in its
pre-2001 version that "[a] person has 'notice' of a fact when ... he
has reason to know that it exists,"89 does not provide an~
explanation of the standard in the Official Comment.
Accordingly, the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, and the pre-2001 version of Article 1 of the
U.C.C., upon which the Restatement's "reason to know" and
"reason to believe" standard was based, do not provide any
significant, additional information to help give greater meaning to
the standard.
Thus, for example~ it remains unclear if "the person" in the
Restatement comment is Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous "bad
man," who cares nothing about morality or causing harm to others
and who acts only in self-interest. 91 The comment indicates that the
person would have "reason to know" if he "would not be acting
adequately in the protection of his own interests were he not acting
with reference to the fact," 92 but does not indicate that there are no
other situations in which he would have reason to know. For
example, is "the person" the reasonably careful person of tort law,
who, unlike Holmes's bad man, takes into consideration the harm
his or her actions might cause to others93 and who is arguably more
careful than the typical person?94 And does the "substantial
chance" standard vary based upon the particular contract doctrine
89. U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (pre-2001 version).
90. See U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 25 (failing to explain when a person "has
reason to know that [a fact] exists").
91. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 459 (1897) (describing a bad man as "[a] man who cares nothing for an
ethical rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors," and who cares
only about the material consequences to himself of his actions).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 19 cmt. b (1981) (emphasis
added).
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. b (1965) (''The
words 'reasonable man' denote a person exercising those qualities of attention,
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its members for
the protection of their own interests and the interests of others." (emphasis
added)).
94. See DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 49 & n.13 ("[T]he expected qualities of
the reasonable person are not necessarily what is the average or even what most
do in the community.... [T]he jury can, and probably often does, set a rather
exacting standard of reasonableness.").
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being applied, or is it a one-size-fits-all standard? No answers are
provided. In other words, the Restatement takes the position that
the "reason to know" and "reason to believe" standard is a
negligence standard, but provides little guidance on applying it. 95
Presumably, under the Restatement, a party always has reason
to know or reason to believe as long as a person of ordinary
intelligence (or the superior intelligence of the party) in the party's
position (i.e., having the same information) would believe there
was a greater-than-50% chance that something exists or will exist.
This· can be gleaned from the comment's statement that there is
reason to know if the person "has information from which a person
of ordinary intelligence would infer that the fact in question does
or will exist. " 96

C. ls the Standard Consistent with Neoclassical Contract Law?
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has been described as
embodying the rules of neoclassical contract law, 97 as opposed to
the rules of classical contract law that were embodied in the
Restatement (First) of Contracts. 98 Professor Grant Gilmore argued
that classical contract law's rules made it difficult to form a
contract and difficult to get out of one, whereas neoclassical
contract law made it easier to form a contract and easier to get out
of one. 99 As Gilmore noted, "[e]vidently a free and easy approach
to the problem of contract formation goes hand in hand with a free
and easy approach to the problem of contract dissolution or
95. Professor Farnsworth, one of the Reporters for the Restatement, includes
a brief discussion of the "reason to know" standard in his hornbook, but he
provides little explanation of the standard, other than to indicate that it is about
fault. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 20, at 449. Farnsworth was not, however,
the Reporter when the Restatement's "reason to know" comment was prepared.
See Foreword to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981). Professor
Robert Braucher, the Reporter at the time the comment was prepared, wrote an
article discussing offer and acceptance in the Restatement, but the article
provides no guidance on what "reason to know" or "reason to believe" means.
See Robert Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE
L.J. 302 (1964).
96. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 19 cmt. b (1981).
97. See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U.
L. REV. 737, 738 (2000) ("Neoclassical contract law-the law of the Uniform
Commercial Code, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts .... ").
98. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic
Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW.
U. L. REV. 854, 855 n.2 (1978) ("Classical contract law refers . . . to that
developed in the 19th century and brought to its pinnacle . . . in the
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932).").
99. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).

2014]

CONTRACT LAW AND THE HAND FORMULA

149

excuse-and vice versa." 100 Professor Duncan Kennedy has
explained that rules that make it difficult to form a contract and
difficult to get out of one are based on notions of individualism,
whereas rules that make it easy to form a contract and easy to get
out of one are based on notions of altruism:
The individualist position is the restriction of obligations of
sharing and sacrifice. This means being opposed to the
broadening, intensifying and extension of liability and
opposed to the liberalization of excuses once duty is
established. This position is only superficially paradoxical.
The contraction of initial liability leaves greater areas for
people to behave in a self-interested fashion. Liberal rules
of excuse have the opposite effect: they oblige the
beneficiary of a duty to share the losses of the obligor when
for some reason he is unable to perform. The altruist
position is the expansion of the network of liability and also
the liberalization of excuses. 101
Additionally, neoclassical contract law favored standards over
rules. 102
Whether the Restatement's use of the "substantial chance" or
negligence ·standard is consistent with the generally recognized
characteristics of neoclassical contract law depends on how the
standard is applied. The "substantial chance" or negligence
standard-which permits a finding that a person had "reason to
know" or "reason to believe" a fact even if a person would believe
its existence (or future existence) was less than 50%-will result in
more contracts being formed if the standard applies to knowing a
fact necessary to form a contract, but would result in fewer
contracts being formed if it applies to knowing a fact that prevents
formation. Characterizing the Restatement's use of the "reason to
know" and "reason to believe" standard as consistent with
neoclassical contract law is difficult, however, because sometimes
the standard is used with respect to a fact necessary to form a
contract and at other times with respect to a fact that defeats
formation.
For example, the definition of offer incorporates the "reason to
believe" standard through the phrase "manifestation of willingness
100. Id. at 48.
IO 1. Kennedy, supra note 84, at 1735.
102. See James W. Fox Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic
Citizenship, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003) ("[W]here classical contract
law was rule-based, neoclassical contract law is more willing to adopt
standards.").
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to enter into a bargain." 103 The indirect use of the "reason to
believe" standard increases the number of communications that
will be offers because the standard is met as long as there was a
substantial-enough chance that the offeree would believe that the
offeror was willing to enter into a bargain.
But the second clause of the definition of offer requires that the
offeree be justified in understanding that his assent will conclude a
bargain without further action by the offeror. 104 And a subsequent
rule makes clear that the offeree is unjustified in believing that the
offeror intends to conclude a bargain without further action by the
offeror if the offeree "knows or has reason to know that the person
making [the communication] does not intend to conclude a bargain
until he has made a further manifestation of assent." 105 Thus, as
long as a person in the offeree's position would have believed that
there was a substantial-enough chance that the offeror did not
intend to conclude a bargain until making a further manifestation
of assent, the communication is not an offer, even if it was a
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain.
Accordingly, the first requirement of an offer applies the
"reason to believe" standard to a fact necessary to form a contract,
but the second requirement applies the "reason to know" standard
to a fact that prevents formation. Thus, it is difficult to characterize
the Restatement's definition of offer as either classical or
neoclassical; it is a bit of both. 106
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 ( 1981 ).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 26 (emphasis added).
106. The definition of promise, like the definition of offer, incorporates the
"justify" standard. A promise is defined as "a manifestation of intention to act or
refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in
understanding that a commitment has been made." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981) (emphasis added). If there was a manifestation of
intention to act in a specified way, whether a promise was made would then
depend on whether the recipient was justified in assuming the statement of
intention was also a commitment. Whether this 'justify" standard within the
definition of promise adopts a "reason to know" standard similar to that in the
offer context, such that a promisee is not justified in understanding that a
commitment has been made if the promisee had reason to know the promisor did
not intend to make a commitment, is unclear. Arguably, a promisee could be
justified in understanding that a commitment has been made as long as there was
reason to know that the promisor was intending to make a commitment. (The
"reason to believe" standard must be used in the latter formulation of the test
because it must be assumed that the promisee misconstrued the promisor's
intention.) Unlike the Restatement's treatment of offer, with its more specific
rule making clear that an offeree is not justified in understanding an offer has
been made if there is reason to know the offeror did not intend to conclude a
bargain without making a further manifestation of assent, there is no such
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Perhaps the most interesting use of the "reason to know"
standard is with respect to contract interpretation in a case
involving a misunderstanding of a term. Under the Restatement's
rule of interpretation, a party is not bound by the meaning attached
by the other party to a term unless the first party had a greater level
of fault regarding the misunderstanding, with there being two
different fault levels-the higher degree is when the party knew
the other party attached a different meaning to the term, and the
lower degree is when the party had reason to know that the other
party attached a different meaning to the term. 107 If the parties had
a material misunderstanding regarding a term and the level of fault
between the parties was equal, or neither party was at fault because
neither knew nor had reason to know the meaning attached by the
other, there was no manifestation of mutual assent and hence no
contract was formed. 108 The latter rule is often called the Peerless
doctrine after the famous English case-Raffles v. Wichelhaus-in
which there was a misunderstanding about which ship the parties
intended in a contract for the sale of cotton to be shipped "ex
Peerless." 109
It is commonly believed that this rule of interpretation involves
determining which party was more at fault for the misunderstanding

specific rule regarding promise to explain when a promisee is justified in
understanding that a commitment has been made. This "justify" standard is not
explained in the Restatement comment on promise, other than providing one
example of when a promisee would not be justified in believing that a
commitment has been made. See id. § 2 cmt. e ("Even if a present intention is
manifested, the reservation of an option to change that intention means that there
can be no promisee who is justified in an expectation of performance."). The
plain meaning of justify is "to prove or show to be just, right, or reasonable."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 680 (11th ed. 2003). The word
just is not helpful because it simply begs the question. If the word right is used,
then it would seem that the promisee or offeree is only justified if it turns out
that the promisor did, in fact, intend to make a commitment, which would be
inconsistent with the objective theory of contract. The word reasonable
therefore seems to be the best fit for giving meaning to justify as that word is
used in the definition of promise. This would mean that a promisee is justified in
understanding that a commitment has been made as long as such an
understanding was reasonable. And reasonable simply means "not extreme or
excessive." Id. at 1037. Ultimately, however, the Restatement leaves it unclear
whether the "justify" standard in the definition of promise adopts a standard that
asks whether the promisee had reason to know the offeror was not intending to
make a commitment, or that asks whether the promisee had reason to know the
offeror was intending to make a commitment.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 201 (1981).
108. Id.§ 20(1).
109. (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (K.B.); 2 Hurl. & C. 906.
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over the meaning of a particular term, with fault being assessed
comparatively on a continuum. Professor William Young wrote, "if
neither [party] is chargeable with carelessness, or one not more than
the other, then there is no contract." 110 Judge Richard Posner
explained the holding in Raffles as follows: "As there was no basis
for thinking either party's mistake more careless than the other
party's-or, stated differently, no reason to think one party's
understanding of the contract more reasonable than the other'sthe court held there was no contract." 111 Oliver Wendell Holmes's
famous discussion of the Peerless doctrine seemingly adopts this
comparative fault standard, noting that if there was only one ship
Peerless and the buyer had intended to saii "Peri" but instead said
"Peerless," "he would have been bound." 12 If this explanation of
the rules of interpretation is correct, the misunderstanding doctrine
is consistent with neoclassical contract law because few
misunderstandings will involve two plausible meanings that are
equally reasonable. Thus, few bargains will fail to become
contracts under the Peerless doctrine.
The Restatement, however, by incorporating the "reason to
know" standard adopts a contributory-fault standard, not a
comparative-fault standard. The Restatement provides that there is
no manifestation of mutual assent if each party had "reason to
know" of the meaning attached by the other party. 113 As previously
explained, under the Restatement, a party has reason to know of a
fact not only if the party has reason to know that it is more likely
than not that the fact exists, but also "if the inference would be that
there is such a substantial chance of the existence of the fact that,
if exercising reasonable care with reference to the matter in
question, the person would predicate his action upon the
assumption ofits possible existence." 114
The distinction between the Restatement's contributory-fault
standard and a comparative-fault standard can be illustrated by the
issue in Raffles, using Holmes's example as a twist on the facts. In
Raffles the parties entered into a contract for the sale of cotton to
110. William F. Young Jr., Equivocation in the Making of Agreements, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 619, 630 (1964) (emphasis added).
111. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 104 (6th ed.
2003) (emphasis added).
112. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 242 (Little, Brown
& Co. 1881) (1963).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 20(1) (1981) (providing
that "[t]here is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties
attach materially different meanings to their manifestations and . . . each party
has reason to know the meaning attached by the other").
114. Id.§ 19 cmt. b (emphasis added).
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arrive at Liverpool "ex Peerless" from Bombay. 115 The cotton
arrived at Liverpool on a shiR named Peerless, but the buyer
refused to accept or pay for it. 16 When the seller sued the buyer
for breach of contract, the buyer argued that he had intended the
cotton to arrive on a ship named Peerless that sailed from Bombay
in October, but the cotton arrived on a different ship named
Peerless that sailed from Bombay in December. 117 The seller
demurred to the buyer's plea, thus admitting that the parties had
each intended a different ship named Peerless. 118 When the buyer
argued that "there was no consenus [sic] ad idem, and therefore no
binding contract," he was immediately stopped by the court, which
declared that there must be a judgment for the buyer. 119
Now, unlike the actual facts, assume that there is Just one ship
named Peerless and another ship named Pierless. 12 The buyer,
unfamiliar with the shipping industry, knows only of the ship
named Pierless, but the seller, familiar with the shipping industry,
knows of both ships. The seller knows that 20% of the written
references by persons to Peerless are intended to be references to
Pierless. The buyer and seller enter into a written agreement for
the sale of cotton from Bombay "ex Peerless." The buyer intends
the reference to be to the ship Pierless, which is leaving Bombay
in October, and the seller intends the reference to be to the ship
Peerless, which is leaving Bombay in December. Neither party,
however, knows of the different meaning attached by the other.
Has there been a manifestation of mutual assent?
Under the Restatement's contributory-fault standard, the issue
would be whether either or both of the parties were at fault for the
misunderstanding and, if so, whether one was more at fault, but
only two degrees of fault would be used-"know" and "reason to
know" of the misunderstanding. 121 The buyer had reason to know
that the seller intended the reference to be to the ship Peerless,
even though he did not know of that ship. Most persons use words
correctly, not incorrectly, and the written agreement referred to
Peerless. Thus, he had information from which a person of
ordinary intelligence would infer that the seller intended a ship
different from the Pierless. As previously noted, Holmes believed
the case would end here, with the meaning of Peerless, as used in
the written agreement, meaning the ship Peerless. But under the
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

(1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (K.B.); 2 Hurl. & C. 906.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Professor Charles Knapp deserves recognition for the name Pierless.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20( 1) ( 1981 ).
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Restatement's "substantial chance" or negligence standard, the
seller might have had reason to know that the buyer intended the
reference to Peerless be to the ship Pier/ess. A 20% chance might
be substantial enough to conclude that the seller had reason to
know of the misunderstanding.
The "reason to know" contributory-negligence standard for
interpretation therefore results in the formation of fewer contracts
than under a comparative-negligence standard. Thus, the use of
this standard is inconsistent with neoclassical contract law's
emphasis on finding that a contract was formed. Whether this
result was intended or even recognized by the drafters of the
Restatement is unclear.
Accordingly, it is difficult to characterize the Restatement's use
of the "reason to know" and "reason to believe" standard as either
consistent or inconsistent with neoclassical contract law as a
general matter. It will depend on how the standard is used in a
particular black letter rule. The "substantial chance" or negligence
standard is, however, at least consistent with neoclassical contract
law's emphasis on standards over rules.
Ill. THE HAND FORMULA
Unlike contract law, tort law has devoted considerable
attention to defining negligence. Under tort law, "[a] person acts
negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under
all the circumstances." 122 And "[b ]ecause a 'reasonably careful
person' (or a 'reasonably prudent person') is one who acts with
reasonable care, the 'reasonable care' standard for negligence [in
tort law] is basically the same as a standard expressed in terms of
the 'reasonably careful person' (or the 'reasonably prudent
person')." 123 Oliver Wendell Holmes explained the rationale
behind tort law's reasonably careful person standard:
[W]hen men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a
sacrifice of individual peculiarities going beyond a certain
point, is necessary to the general welfare. If, for instance, a
man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents
and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his
congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of
Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his
neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM§ 3 (2010).
123. Id. § 3 cmt. a.
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neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come
up to their standard, and the courts which they establish
decline to take his personal equation into account. ... The law
considers, in other words, what would be blameworthy in the
average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence,
and determines liability by that. If we fall below the level in
those gifts, it is our misfortune; so much as that we must have
at our peril, for the reasons just given." 124
Under negligence law, a person is not liable simply because
she engages in conduct that creates a risk of harm to others,
because "[a]ll conduct creates some risk." 125 Rather, a person is
only liable for conduct that involves "unreasonable risk creation,"
i.e., "risks that a reasonable person would not [create]." 126 Limiting
liability to harm caused through negligence is justified on the
ground that it is unjust to hold someone liable for non-negligently
caused harm, and on the ground that such a limitation will lead to
the efficient level of accidents and precautions. 127
Despite Holmes's reference to the "average man," tort law's
reasonably careful person "is not [in fact] to be identified with any
ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable
things; he is a prudent and careful person, who is always up to
standard." 128 As explained by the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
In cases in which the actor allegedly is negligent for not
having adverted to the risk, the jury might determine that
the reasonably careful person would advert to this risk nine
times out of 10. Such a determination acknowledges that
such an actor would not notice the tisk one time out of 10.
The function of the jury is to consider what the reasonably
careful person would have done in the particular factual
situation, not what that person would do over an extended
period of time. Hence, if the probability is 90 percent that
the reasonably careful person would have adverted to the
particular risk, a finding that the actor was negligent is
obligatory. Because the jury focuses on the conduct of the
reasonably careful person in each particular case, the
fallibility of average persons over a period of time is a
reality the jury is not in a position to consider. Accordingly,
tort law's case-by-case focus makes it appropriate to say
124. HOLMES, supra note 112, at 86-87.
125. DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 47.
126. Id at 62.
127. Id
128. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 74, at 175.

156

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

that the reasonably careful person is infallible in a way that
ordinary people are not. 129
To determine whether a person's conduct has created an
unreasonable risk of harm-and thus a risk that the reasonably
careful person would not take-Judge Learned Hand, in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., famously identified three factors to
consider: the probability of harm; the gravity of the harm; and .the
burden of taking adequate precautions. 130 He then provided what
came to be known as the Hand formula for determining whether a
person acted negligently: "[I]f the probability be called P; the
injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is
less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL." 131 Thus,
"[t]he Hand Formula posits that a reasonable person balances costs
and benefits in light of prevailing values in matters of safety and
safety costs." 132 When a person's action causes more harm than
good, there are squandered resources, and moral indignation might
be justified. 133 In such a situation the actor should pay for the harm
done, provided that it was foreseeable that the harm would
outweigh the benefit. But when a person's action, or inaction,
results in greater benefit than harm, and thus results in an overall
benefit to society, there is no such moral indignation and "no
occasion to condemn the defendant." 134 The Hand formula is
therefore correctly considered to be primarily utilitarian. 135
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 cmt. k (2010).
130. United States v. Carroll.Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
131. Id.
132. Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015,
1053 (1994).
133. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33
(1972).
134. Id.
135. Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law,
47 AM. J. JURIS. 143, 178 (2002). The Hand formula has been criticized as being
morally perverse because its utilitarian cost-benefit analysis might render a
person not liable for engaging in actions that our moral intuitions would tell us
are wrong and avoid the person having to pay for harm caused simply because
the benefit to the actor was greater than the harm caused to the victim. See
generally William E. Nelson, The Moral Perversity of the Hand Calculus, 45
Sr. LOUIS U. L.J. 759 (2001); see also Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and
the Myth of the 'Hand Formula', 4 J. THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 145, 146
(2003) ("Although some scholars once asserted that this aggregate-risk-utility
definition of negligence is consistent with the principles of justice, almost all of
them now acknowledge that it is a transparent implementation of the basic
principles of utilitarianism and its modem offshoot, economic efficiency theory,
and as such is in direct conflict with the principles of justice."). The Restatement
(Third) of Torts rejects a strict utilitarian approach, stating that it is appropriate
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The Hand formula has been endorsed by the American Law
136
Institute, "by the leading treatises, and by courts in most states." For
example, the Restatement (Third) of Torts provides: "Primary factors
to consider in ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks
reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person's
conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that
may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the
risk ofharm." 137
The Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes that these are just
factors, and "in particular categories of cases the inquiry into
reasonable care, or the conduct of the reasonably prudent person,
requires attention to considerations or circumstances that supplement
or somewhat subordinate the primary factors." 138 The Restatement
(Third) of Torts indicates that the primary factors are most relevant
when the actor is aware of some risk but is willing to tolerate the risk
because of the burden of preventing it. 139 When the actor fails to
recognize a risk, "explicit consideration of the primary factors is often
awkward, and the actor's conduct can best be evaluated bi¥ directly
14
applying the standard of the reasonably careful person."

to ignore the benefits obtained by an actor engaging !n conduct that is frowned
upon by society. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. h (2010) ("In most circumstances, negligence law
takes into account and credits whatever burdens of risk prevention are actually
experienced by the actor and others. While negligence law is concerned with
social interests, courts regularly consider private interests, both because society
is the protector of private interests and because the general public good is
promoted by the protection and advancement of private interests. Nevertheless,
in certain negligence cases there may be burdens of risk prevention that courts
properly discount or decline to acknowledge. For example, certain motoriststhough hoping for and expecting a favorable outcome-may find it exciting to
race a railroad train toward a highway crossing. Yet because society may not
recognize that excitement as appropriate, it may be ignored by the jury in
considering whether the motorist should have driven more conservatively.").
136. Gilles, supra note 132, at 1015-16. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. d, reporter's note
(2010) ("Leading torts treatises support the balancing approach to negligence.
The approach is also highlighted in almost every torts casebook, most of which
indeed present as a central case Judge Hand's opinion in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co. . . . A balancing approach to negligence has been accepted in
judicial opinions in a large majority of jurisdictions.... Overall ... a large
number of judicial opinions support the balancing approach to negligence .... "
(internal citations omitted)).
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 (2010).
138. Id. § 3 cmt. d.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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The Hand formula's burden factor takes into account not only the
cost of precautions but also the benefits to be expected from the risky
behavior. 141 Thus, determining the burden is multi-faceted, requiring
"consideration of such things as the costs associated with avoiding the
harm, alternatives and their feasibility, the inconvenience to those
involved, and the extent to which society values the relevant
activity." 142 The burden includes "endeavoring to gather more
infonnation before engaging in conduct, and also the burden the actor
would have borne in making such an effort." 143
Once the degree of burden is established, the foreseeable
likelihood of harm must be multiplied by the foreseeable gravity of
harm that might occur. 144 Even if the foreseeable likelihood of
harm is small, negligence can be found if the foreseeable gravity of
the harm is large and the burden of taking adequate precautions is
slight. 145 With respect to the foreseeable likelihood of harm, it
must have been foreseeable at the time of the conduct. 146 And with
respect to the foreseeable gravity of the harm, it is not the harm
actually suffered by the plaintiff, but any harm that was
foreseeable at the time of the conduct. 147
Because quantifying the various factors in the Hand formula
will often be difficult in specific cases, the formula is not one that
"generates determinative results." 148 It does, however, identify
important factors to ·consider in deciding whether the actor was
negligent. 149

IV. WHY THE HAND FORMULA SHOULD APPLY TO CONTRACT
LAW'S "REASON TO KNOW" AND "REASON TO BELIEVE" STANDARD
Accepting the Restatement's use of the "reason to know" and
"reason to believe" standard, and accepting the Restatement's
position that the standard is a negligence standard that might find
141. Id.
142. DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 65.
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 cmt. g (2010).
144. See id. § 3 cmt. e ("Conduct is negligent if its disadvantages outweigh
its advantages, while conduct is not negligent if its advantages outweigh its
disadvantages. The disadvantage in question is the magnitude of risk that the
conduct occasions . . . . [T]he phrase 'magnitude of risk' includes both the
foreseeable likelihood of harm and the foreseeable severity of the harm that
might ensue.").
145. Id. § 3 cmt. f.
146. Id. § 3 cmt. g.
147. Id. § 3 cmt. h.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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there was "reason to know" or "reason to believe" even when a
person would believe the chance of a particular fact existing
(currently or in the future) is less than 50%, 150 the Hand formula
should apply to the standard for several reasons.
First, because the "reason to know" and "reason to believe"
standard is vague, a test to give it greater definition would be
useful. And because the standard is so prevalent throughout
contract doctrines, providing greater definition to it is particularly
important.
Second, the Restatement articulates a negligence standard, and
the Hand formula is well established in law as the standard for
determining whether a person has acted negligently. 151 Applying
the Hand formula to contract law's "reason to know" and "reason
to believe" standard would therefore help promote uniformity in
the law.
.
Third, the Hand formula's utilitarian approach is arguably
more suitable for contract law than tort law because contract law is
primarily about facilitating exchange, 152 whereas tort law is largely
about preventing physical harm. Thus, any moral objection to the
Hand formula's utilitarian approach has less weight with respect to
contract law.
Fourth, as will be shown in the next Part through an application
of the Hand formula to several contract-law doctrines, the factors
considered under the Hand formula are factors that intuitively
appear relevant to contract-law cases, but which would be ignored
under a traditional contract-law analysis. Applying the Hand
formula would therefore make contract law more consistent with
generally held notions of morality, which in tum would make
contract law more legitimate to the public.
Fifth, use of the Hand formula will incorporate a consideration
of the foreseeable loss to the other party, and not simply focus on
the self-interest of the actor (like Holmes's bad man). This will
increase overall societal welfare.
Sixth, because the Hand formula takes into account the burden
(or lack thereof) of taking adequate precautions, parties will not
only be judged by the information they have, but the information
that is readily available to them.

150. This Article does not take a position on whether this approach is correct
from a normative standpoint. Such an approach is open to substantial criticism.
151. See supra note 136.
152. See Nathan B. Oman, Markets As a Moral Foundation for Contract
Law. 98 IOWA L. REV. 183. 187 (2012) (noting that "contract law exists
primarily to support markets").
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An anticipated objection to applying the Hand formula to the
"reason to know" and "reason to believe" standard is that it will
unnecessarily complicate the analysis of contract-law issues, and
that its frequent inability to provide determinative results makes it
not worth the effort. But the Restatement's "substantial chance" or
negligence test for the "reason to know" and "reason to believe"
standard has already complicated contract law and has made it
difficult to provide determinative results to contract-law issues.
The question is not whether the Hand formula is easy to apply or
whether it provides determinative results in most cases; the
question is whether applying the Hand formula will make a vague
standard easier to apply and provide determinative results in more
cases than applying the vague standard without it. And the answer
to these questions is "yes." Greater definition is better than less
definition.
V. APPLYING THE HAND FORMULA TO CONTRACT DOCTRINES

This Part explains how the Hand formula would apply in
contract law, and then applies the formula to various black letter
rules incorporating the "reason to know" and "reason to believe"
standard, either directly through the use of the former phrase or
indirectly through the use of the words manifestation, manifest, or
manifested. For many of the black letter rules discussed, a wellknown case will be used to illustrate how the Hand formula would
apply. Because the Hand formula often does not provide
determinative results, and because reasonable persons will often
disagree on how the primary factors apply, this Part's principal
purpose is not to show what the correct result should be in each
case. Rather, its principal purpose is to show a new way of
applying established contract doctrines.

A. B, P, & L in Contract Law
As previously discussed, under the Hand formula, the
defendant was not negligent if the burden of avoiding the loss (B)
was greater than the probability of foreseeable loss (P) multiplied
by the foreseeable gravity of the loss (L). In contrast, the defendant
was negligent if the burden of avoiding the loss (B) was less than
the probability of foreseeable loss (P) multiplied by the foreseeable
gravity of the loss (L). Thus, B >PL = not negligent; B <PL =
negligent.
Before applying the Hand formula to contract-law doctrines,
one must identify that to which B, P, and L refer in a contract
setting. The Hand formula, when applied in contract law, would
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focus on a party predicating his or her action upon the assumption
of a fact's non-existence when the chance of its existence is
somewhere between 1% and 50%. If the chance is greater than
50%, the party is conclusively presumed to have reason to know of
its existence (or reason to believe of its foture existence) and the
Hand formula would not apply, and if it is 0%, there is no reason to
know or reason to believe because there is no possibility of its
existence. L would refer to the foreseeable loss when the party
predicates his or her action upon the assumption of the fact's nonexistence or its future existence and it turns out that the fact exists
or comes into existence. P refers to the foreseeable probability that
the party's assumption is incorrect and the fact exists or comes into
existence-between 1% and 50%, depending on the circumstances.
B refers to the burden of avoiding the foreseeable loss.
Although the referents might vary based upon the particular
contract doctrine being considered, when the rule involves a
communication, L will often refer to the foreseeable loss caused by
the speaker using language carelessly. Such harm will usually take
the form of reliance by the recipient based on the belief that the
speaker intends to act in a particular way, when the actor in fact
intends to act in another way or not act at all. P will usually refer to
the foreseeable likelihood that the recipient of the communication
will misconstrue the speaker's intentions. B will usually refer to
the amount of effort it would have taken for the speaker to have
used her language in a way that would have avoided the
misunderstanding, or to have taken other action to avoid the harm
caused by the misunderstanding-such as acquiring additional
information before speaking. But, as previously noted, the
referents will differ based on the particular contract doctrine under
consideration.
B. Applying the Hand Formula to Specific Contract Doctrines

Let us begin the application of the Hand formula to specific
contract doctrines by applying it to a doctrine that will easily
illustrate how the formula would justify the conclusion that an
actor can be negligent when incorrectly assuming a fact does not
exist, even though a person of ordinary intelligence would have
believed there was a 50%-or-less chance of the particular fact
existing: the contract doctrine relating to intoxication. Contract
doctrine provides that "[a] person incurs only voidable contractual
duties by entering into a transaction if the other party has reason to
know that by reason of intoxication (a) he is unable to understand
in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the
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transaction, or (b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in
relation to the transaction." 153
Assume that a person who manifests assent to a face-to-face
bargain is so intoxicated that he is unable to understand in a
reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the deal. The
non-intoxicated party knows that the other party is intoxicated, but
based on the information the non-intoxicated party has, a person in
the non-intoxicated party's position would believe the likelihood
the intoxicated person is so intoxicated that he is unable to
understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of
the proposed deal is just 25%. Although there is no need to
immediately reach a deal, the non-intoxicated party manifests
assent on the spot and she later seeks to enforce the contract,
despite having no tangible reliance. In response, the intoxicated
party argues that the contract is voidable because the nonintoxicated party had reason to know that he was so intoxicated he
was "unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and
consequences of the transaction." 154 In reply, the non-intoxicated
party argues that she did not have reason to know that it was more
likely than not that the intoxicated party was so intoxicated that he
was unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and
consequences of the transaction, and therefore the contract should
not be voidable.
Most persons would probably believe that any resulting
contract should be voidable by the intoxicated party. Applying the
Hand formula to the "reason to know" standard in the intoxication
rule produces this result because it shows that the reasonably
careful person would have waited until the intoxicated person was
sober before closing the deal.
The burden of avoiding any loss by asc_ertaining whether the
fact existed, i.e., whether the intoxicated party was so intoxicated
that he was unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature
and consequences of the transaction, would have involved waiting
until the next day to confirm whether the now-sober party in fact
wants to enter into the deal. This burden was slight because there
was no urgency to forming the contract. Although a loss to the
non-intoxicated party from not concluding the deal on the spot
might be not obtaining a contract he desired and thus disappointed
expectations, the loss is insignificant when one considers that
contracts should be mutually beneficial, not simply beneficial for
one party.

153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 16 (1981) (emphasis added).
154." Id § 16(a).
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The foreseeable magnitude of loss from the non-intoxicated
party predicating her action on the belief that the intoxicated party
is not too intoxicated includes any harm that might be expected
from a dispute over whether the resulting contract is voidable, and
imposing on the intoxicated party a duty of performing an
unintended promise (if the non-intoxicated party is not considered
negligent, the contract will not be voidable). The foreseeable
probability of loss was, however, small-just 25%. Importantly,
though, the likelihood of loss is still enough when multiplied by
the foreseeable magnitude of loss to outweigh the very small
burden of waiting another day.
Accordingly, applying the Hand formula shows that the nonintoxicated party should be deemed to have had reason to know
that the intoxicated party was so intoxicated that he did not
understand the nature and consequences of the proposed
transaction. The contract should therefore be voidable even though
the chance of the fact existing was less than 50%.
The Restatement provides an illustration involving intoxication
based on a modified version of the well-known case of Lucy v.
Zehmer. 155 Under the illustration, either the offerer was not
sufficiently intoxicated or, if he was, a person of ordinary
intelligence would not have believed the chance was substantial
enough. The illustration provides as follows:
A has been drinking heavily. B, who has also been drinking,
meets A, offers to buy A's farm for $50,000, a fair price, and
offers A a drink which A accepts. In drunken exhilaration A, as

a joke, writes out and signs a memorandum of agreement to
sell, gets his wife to sign it, and delivers it to B, who
understands the transaction as a serious one. A's intoxication is
no defense to B's suit for specific performance. 156
If, however, A was in fact so intoxicated that he did not understand
the nature and consequences of the transaction, and there were
more facts that would have led B to have reason to know that there
was a substantial chance A was that intoxicated (even if 50% or
below), the resulting contract should be voidable if the Hand
formula applies to the "reason to know" standard. And this
conclusion likely comports with what most persons would believe
would be a just outcome in such a case.
In fact, a case involving intoxication discusses the rule in terms
of a cost-benefit analysis by the person who was not intoxicated.
155. 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 16, illus. 3 (1981) (emphasis
added).
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The court, discussing a settlement agreement signed by a person
who was allegedly intoxicated at the time, but who signed it
outside of the presence of the other party, noted the burden that
would be placed on the other party if such a release was voidable:
Under such a proposition, for parties to have any
confidence in their ability to enforce settlement agreements,
they would have to take such drastic steps as administering
a blood test to establish sobriety at the moment of signature
or agreeing to enter into the waiver agreement before a
judge who could observe the sobriety of the signing parties.
Such a rule would place unnecessary burdens on both
employees and employers who desire to settle their claims
simply, efficiently, and independently of the courts, and
undercut many of the goals of the voluntary settlement
process. 157
Note that the court relied not only on the burden of confirming
whether the party who signed the release was intoxicated, but also
on the benefits gained from settling disputes without court
involvement.
The next doctrine that will be used to illustrate how the Hand
formula would apply to contract law is the requirement that the
formation of a contract include an offer. 158 An offer is "the
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to
justify another person in understandin¥ that his assent to that
59
bargain is invited and will conclude it." The definition of offer
indirectly incorporates the "reason to believe" standard because a
manifestation of intention exists when a person "has reason to
believe that the promisee will infer that intention from his words or
conduct." 160 It also indirect! y incorporates the "reason to know"
standard because the recipient is not justified in understanding that
157. Gaub v. Prof. Hosp. Supply, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1131 (D. Idaho
2012). Thus, the Restatement provides the following illustration: "A, while in a
state of extreme intoxication, signs and mails a written offer on fair terms to B,
who has no reason to know of the intoxication. B accepts the offer. A has no
right to avoid the contract." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 16, illus.
1 (1981) (emphasis added).
158. See Zheng v. City of New York, 940 N.Y.S.2d 582, 586 (App. Div.
2012) ("To demonstrate the existence of an enforceable agreement, a plaintiff
must establish an offer .... ").
159. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 24 (1981).
160. Id. § 2 cmt. b. There is no suggestion in the Restatement that this
standard for "manifestation of intention" would not apply to a "manifestation of
willingness," and thus a person would manifest a willingness to enter into a
bargain when she has reason to believe that the promisee will infer that
willingness from his words or conduct.
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his assent to the proposed bargain is invited and will conclude it if
he has "reason to know" otherwise. 161 To demonstrate how the
Hand formula would apply to offers, cases involving two different
contexts will be discussed-jokes and preliminary negotiations.
Lucy v. Zehmer is perhaps the most celebrated case involving
an alleged joke. 162 In Lucy, the plaintiff alleged that he and the
defendant entered into a contract under which the defendant
promised to sell his farm to the plaintiff in exchange for the
plaintiffs promise to pay the defendant $50,000 (apparently a fair
price). 163 They allegedly entered into the contract at a bar while
they were drinking alcohol, with the defendant manifesting assent
by writing the terms of the deal on the back of a restaurant
check. 164 The defendant argued that it had all been a joke, but the
plaintiff alleged he (the plaintiff) had taken it seriously. 165 The
issue, therefore, was whether, under the objective theory of
contract, there had been a manifestation of mutual assent. 166
Assuming the defendant was the offeror, 167 and applying the
Restatement's definition of offer, the issue would be phrased as
whether the defendant had reason to believe that the plaintiff
would infer willingness bl the defendant to enter into a bargain for
the sale of the farm. 16 Using the Restatement's "substantial
chance" or negligence standard, the question would not be whether
a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would have believed
it was more likely than not that the defendant was serious, or
whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would
have believed that the plaintiff would more likely than not take the
defendant seriously. Rather, the issue would be whether (1) a
person of ordinary intelligence in the defendant's position would
have believed there was more than a 50% chance the plaintiff
161. Id.§26.
162. 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
163. Id. at517.
164. Id. at 517-18.
165. Id. at 517-20.
166. Id. at 520.
167. It is unclear which party was in fact the offeror in Lucy v. Zehmer. The
court made reference to Lucy being the offeror. See id. at 522 ("Whether the
writing signed by the defendants and now sought to be enforced by the
complainants was the result of a serious offer by Lucy and a serious acceptance
by the defendants, or was a serious offer by Lucy and an acceptance in secret
jest by the defendants, in either event it constituted a binding contract of sale
between the parties."). Arguably, however, there was no offer until Zehmer
wrote the terms on the back of the restaurant check, and this Article will assume
that is when an offer was first made, with the preceding events being
preliminary negotiations.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 2 cmt. b (1981).
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would take the defendant seriously or, if not, (2) whether there was
a substantial-enough chance that a person of ordinary intelligence
would take the defendant seriously, such that the reasonably
careful .person would have predicated his action based on the
possibility that the plaintiff would take the defendant seriously.
Under the Restatement, if the court concludes that a person in
the defendant's position would have believed there was more than
a 50% chance the plaintiff would take the defendant seriously,
there was a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain.
The plaintiffs acceptance would therefore form a contract because
if there was such a manifestation, the plaintiff was justified in
assuming that "his assent to that bargain is invited and will
conclude it." 169 In such a case, the defendant, to avoid liability,
would have to demonstrate that the contract was voidable, perhaps
under the doctrine of unilateral mistake. 170
If, however, a person in the defendant's position would not
have believed there was more than a 50% chance the plaintiff
would take the defendant seriously, the Hand formula would apply
to determine if there was a substantial-enough chance the plaintiff
would take the defendant seriously, such that the defendant acted
negligently. The foreseeable probability of loss is based on the
probability that the plaintiff would take the defendant seriously.
Let us assume that the foreseeable probability was high, but not
more than 50% because otherwise the Hand formula would not be
used, say exactly 50%. This might not be too far from the
foreseeable probability in the actual case because many facts
suggested the defendant was not serious-the location (a bar), the
alcohol (both were drinking), and using the back of a restaurant
check to make the alleged offer 171 -and many facts suggested the
defendant was, in fact, serious-no laughing (as far as we know),
putting the deal into writing (albeit on the back of a restaurant
check), the discussion lasting around thirty to forty minutes, and an
apparently fair price. 172
The foreseeable magnitude of the loss relates to the reliance
that could have been expected from the plaintiff relying on the
169. Id. § 24.
170. See id. § 153 ("Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was
made as to a basic assumption on which he made the contract has a material
effect on the agreed exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the
contract is voidable by him ifhe does not bear the risk of the mistake ... and (a)
the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be
unconscionable, or (b) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his
fault caused the mistake.").
171. Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 518-20.
172. Id. at517-18.
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apparent offer, both in terms of disappointed .expectations and
wasted, tangible reliance. Here, the expected magnitude of loss
was likely small. The type of foreseeable, tangible reliance was
probably limited to the plaintiff determining whether there was
satisfactory title and raising the $50,000 (which the plaintiff would
retain if the defendant refused to go through with the deal). 173 The
foreseeable magnitude of loss must also take into account the
possibility that the defendant will realize that the plaintiff has taken
him seriously before he (the plaintiff) tangibly relies on the apparent
deal, thus enabling the defendant to avoid this particular type of losswasted, tangible reliance by the plaintiff-before it occurs. Such a
realization before tangible reliance would also reduce, though not
eliminate, the harm from disappointed expectations-the sooner one
learns the truth the less disappointment, presumably-and the chance
of a dispute between the parties over whether a contract was formedthe plaintiff might take the position of"no harm, no foul." In Lucy, the
chance of this happening was high because the parties were
negotiating face to face, and the defendant would have the opportunity
to clear up any misunderstanding if it became apparent to the
defendant before the plaintiff left the bar and started relying on the
deal. And the likelihood the defendant would recognize that the
plaintiff had taken it seriously-before the plaintiff left the barwas high because jokes usually do not end on a serious note.
In fact, this is exactly what the defendant alleged happened.
The defendant alleged that as soon as he realized the plaintiff had
taken the intended joke seriously, he told the plaintiff, "Hell no, that is
beer and liquor talking. I am not goin~ to sell you the farm. I have told
you that too many times before." 74 This case thus fits within
Professor P.S. Atiyah's observation that "[f]requently, a promisebased claim is based on relatively short-lived expectations; for it is
where the promisor has (for instance) made some mistake, or
overlooked some fact, that he is most likely to attempt to withdraw his
promise." 175 And because the trial court ruled in the defendant's favor,
the appellate court was required to accept the defendant's testimony
as true unless it was clearly against the evidence, something often
overlooked in discussions about the case. 176 Although considering
173. The plaintiffs duty to proceed with the sale was conditioned on title
being satisfactory to him. See id. at 517 (noting that the alleged contract stated,
"We hereby agree to sell to W. 0. Lucy the Ferguson Farm complete for
$50,000.00, title satisfactory to buyer").
174. Id. at 519.
175. See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 4
(1979).
176. Although all of the testimony in Lucy was by deposition, see 84 S.E.2d
at 518, a trial court's factual findings in such a case are still presumed to be
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that such after-the-promise events would be inappropriate in a
Hand formula analysis, which focuses on what was foreseeable at
the time of action, these facts show how the communication's
context-face-to-face discussions-reduces the foreseeable
magnitude of loss. Thus, the foreseeable magnitude of loss was
actually quite small in Lucy. Accordingly, P multiplied by L does
not seem to be very high, even if P is 50%.
The defendant's burden to avoid the misunderstanding
involved him making it clear that it was all in jest before the
plaintiff manifested assent. In one respect, this would seem to be
minimal. All the defendant had to do was not joke around about
selling the farm, particularly for as long as thirty to forty minutes,
or make it clear it was all a joke before putting it in writing. There
would, however, be some burden imposed on the defendant if he
was expected to put an end to the joke sooner. There is surely a
societal benefit to joking, and requiring someone in the defendant's
position to make it clear that he is only joking usually decreases
the benefit gained from joking around. Thus, B is perhaps more
difficult to determine than PL.
As a result, whether B is in fact less than PL is debatable. But
the Hand formula does not, of course, always provide a
determinative answer to the question of whether a person acted
negligently. It does, however, focus the inquiry on those factors
that are often most relevant. Applying the Hand formula to Lucy v.
Zehmer might not provide a clear answer to whether the defendant
was negligent, but it identifies the types of questions that should be
asked, and makes relevant the kinds of factors intuitively
considered relevant, such as the likelihood of loss from joking
around and the benefits of such behavior, which would not
ordinarily be considered relevant in a contract-law analysis.
Another well-known contracts case involving an alleged joke is
Leonard v. PepsiCo, lnc. 177 In Leonard, PepsiCo ran a television
commercial to advertise its Pepsi Points program, under which
consumers could trade Pepsi Points for various products, such as a
jacket tattoo and a mountain bike. 178 Pepsi Points could be
obtained either by purchasing Pepsi drinks or by paying ten cents

correct. See Ashby v. Dumouchelle, 40 S.E.2d 493, 496 (Va. 1946) ("While a
decree based upon depositions is not as strong and conclusive as one based on
evidence heard ore tenus, it is presumptively correct, and cannot be disturbed if
it is reasonably supported or sustained by substantial, competent, and credible
evidence. In other words, the evidence must be clearly against the findings in
order to justify a reversal.").
177. 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
178. Jdatl18-19.

2014]

CONTRACT LAW AND THE HAND FORMULA

169

per point. 179 At the end of the commercial, a high-school student
lands a military jet on school grounds, and the following words
appear at the bottom of the screen: "HARRIER FIGHTER
7,000,000 PEPSI POINTS." 180 The plaintiff, who was "young," 181
sent a check to buy enough Pepsi Points to get the jet, but PepsiCo
refused to provide it, explaining that the commercial's reference to
obtaining it was just a joke. 182 The plaintiff then sued PepsiCo for
breach of contract, 183 and the trial court entered summary judgment
in PepsiCo's favor. 184 The appellate court affirmed in a brief
opinion. 185
Assuming that a person in PepsiCo's position would not have
believed there was a greater-than-50% chance someone young like
the plaintiff (PepsiCo was obviously targeting young persons)
would have taken the commercial's reference to a Harrier jet
seriously, applying the Hand formula confirms that the trial court's
decision was correct. Even if the likelihood of loss was high
because many younger viewers would take the commercial' s
reference to a Harrier jet seriously (a debatable assumption), the
foreseeable magnitude of loss was likely quite small. The
likelihood a younger viewer would in fact take it seriously, then set
out to obtain enough Pepsi Points, and then actually obtain enough
to get the jet is surely very low, particularly because younger
viewers were not likely to have the money to buy enough Pepsi
Points for the jet.
Also, a person who sent in a check seeking to buy that many
Pepsi Points to purchase the Harrier jet would be met with a letter
from PepsiCo returning the check and explaining it was all a joke,
which, of course, is exactly what happened. Although a person
might buy a lot of Pepsi drinks to obtain Pepsi Points (though
certainly not enough to get seven million points), the person would
in fact have the Pepsi to drink. One would certainly not expect
someone to take any other actions in the expectation of obtaining a
Harrier jet, such as building a runway, and would particularly not
expect this of the targeted audience of young people. Note that
under a traditional contract-law analysis, the foreseeable
magnitude of the loss would be irrelevant, but in Leonard, the fact
that the foreseeable magnitude of loss is very slight seems
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 120-21.
Id. at 132.
See Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
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intuitively relevant to reaching a just result. Thus, PL is likely very
low in Leonard, even if P is somewhat high.
In contrast, the burden on PepsiCo is perhaps considerable. The
commercial's use of the Harrier jet created an image that persons
who used Pepsi products are "cool." As recognized by the trial
judge:
[T]he commercial suggests, as commercials often do, that
use of the advertised product will transform what, for most
youth, can be a fairly routine and ordinary experience. The
military tattoo and stirring martial music, as well as the use
of subtitles in a Courier font that scroll terse messages
across the screen, such as "MONDAY 7:58 AM," evoke
military and espionage thrillers. The implication of the
commercial is that Pepsi Stuff merchandise will inject
drama and moment into hitherto unexceptional lives. The
commercial in this case thus makes the exaggerated claims
similar to those of many television advertisements: that by
consuming the featured clothing, car, beer, or potato chips,
one will become attractive, stylish, desirable, and admired
by all.1s6
To hold PepsiCo liable would mean that it and other advertisers
would have to include a disclaimer making it clear in the
advertisement that the jet's availability was just a joke, detracting
from the commercial's impact. Arguably, however, such a burden
is not as substantial as the burden in a case like Lucy v. Zehmer
because more time is put into advertisements than a barroom
conversation over drinks. In any event, B would seem to be higher
than PL, and the Hand formula supports the court's conclusion in
Leonard, which is that there was no offer.
Next, consider the issue of preliminary negotiations. The rule is
that "[a] manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not
an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason
to know that the person making it does not intend to conclude a
bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent." 187
Assume a case in which an apparent offer has been made during
negotiations-that is, the alleged offeror has manifested a
willingness to enter into a bargain-and a person of ordinary
intelligence in the position of the recipient would believe there is a
less-than-50% chance that the alleged offeror only intends to
conclude a bargain upon making a further manifestation of assent.
Assume further that the alleged offeror does not, in fact, intend to
186. Leonard, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 128.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 26 (1981) (emphasis added).
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conclude a bargain until making a further manifestation of assent.
To determine whether the chance is substantial enough, the Hand
formula would be applied. And to see how it would apply, the
well-known case of PFT Roberson, Inc. v. Volvo Trucks North
America, Inc. will be used. 188
In PFT Roberson, the plaintiff, which operated a fleet of longhaul trucks and trailers, and the defendant, a truck manufacturer,
began negotiations with the goal of entering into a fleet agreement,
which is a comprehensive contract providing for the supply and
maintenance of trucks, and the defendant thus manifested a
willingness to enter into a bargain. 189 Many draft agreements were
exchanged but none was signed. 190 Ultimately, the plaintiff sued
the defendant for breach of contract, asserting the parties reached a
binding agreement on certain items in an email in which the
defendant identified those particular items the parties had "come to
agreement on." 191
Assuming a person in the plaintiff's position would believe
there was a less-than-50% chance that the defendant intended to
conclude a bargain on those items only upon a further
manifestation of assent, the Hand formula would apply to
determine if the chance was substantial enough. The foreseeable
likelihood of loss depends upon how likely it was that the
defendant did not intend to reach a deal until the parties had
reached an agreement on all of the terms under discussion. This
chance was likely high, even if it was not greater than 50%.
Sophisticated parties usually do not intend to conclude a deal
piecemeal and by email. The foreseeable magnitude of loss of the
plaintiff predicating its action on the belief the defendant intended
to conclude a deal at that time was also high because it could result
in wasted reliance expenditures by the plaintiff and foregone
opportunities; cause transaction costs disputing whether a contract
was formed; and potentially bind the defendant to a contract it did
not intend to enter into. Also, as the court recognized, permitting a
contract to be concluded when there is doubt as to whether the
parties are still in preliminary negotiations comes with a future
cost:
Often the parties agree on some items ... while others ...
require more negotiation. If any sign of agreement on any
issue exposed the parties to a risk that a judge would deem
the first-resolved items to be stand-alone contracts, the
188. 420 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2005).
189. Id. at 728-29.
190. Id. at 729.
191. Id.
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process of negotiation would be more cumbersome (the
parties would have to hedge every sentence with cautionary
legalese), and these extra negotiating expenses would raise
the effective price (for in a competitive market the buyer
must cover all of the seller's costs). 192
In contrast, the burden on the plaintiff is slight because the
plaintiff easily could have obtained clarification as to whether the
defendant, by its email, intended to conclude a deal on the terms
upon which the parties had already reached an agreement.
Accordingly, in the typical case in which the issue is whether the
parties have formed a contract or are still engaging in preliminary
negotiations, the burden of confirming whether a contract has been
reached will often be less than the foreseeable likelihood of loss
and the foreseeable magnitude of loss. 193
Next, consider the issue of an acceptance. The "reason to
believe" standard applies indirectly to the issue of whether an
acceptance has been made because an acceptance "is a
manifestation of assent to the terms [of the offer] made by the
offeree in a manner invited or required by the offer." 194 To show
how the Hand formula would apply to the issue of whether an
acceptance was made, the well-known case of Embry v.
Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co. will be used. 195
In Embry, the plaintiff employee alleged that in response to
him telling the president of the defendant employer on December
23 that he only had until January 1 to find other employment and
would quit then and there unless given a one-year contract, the
president responded, "Go ahead, you're all right. Get your men
192. Id. at731.
193. The Restatement's preliminary negot1at10ns rule, which makes it
difficult to form an agreement because the "substantial chance" or negligence
standard applies to the offeree having reason to know the offeror did not intend
to conclude a deal until a further manifestation of assent, also applies to
advertisements. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b
(1981). This helps implement the gent!ral rule that advertisements are not offers.
See id. ("Advertisements of goods by display, sign, handbill, newspaper, radio
or television are not ordinarily intended or understood as offers to sell. The same
is true of catalogues, price lists and circulars, even though the terms of
suggested bargains may be stated in some detail."); id. § 26, illus. 1 ("A, a
clothing merchant, advertises overcoats of a certain kind for sale at $50. This is
not an offer, but an invitation to the public to come and purchase." (emphasis
added)). Whether advertisements should be treated under a separate rule that
uses the "reason to know" standard differently is an interesting policy question,
but is beyond the scope of this Article, which accepts the Restatement rules as
adopted.
194. Id. § 50(1) (emphasis added).
195. 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907).
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out, and don't let that worry you." 196 The plaintiff alleged that the
president's response constituted an acceptance of the plaintiff's
offer of reemployment for one year. 197
Assuming that a person in the president's position would have
believed there was less than a 50% chance that the plaintiff would
construe his response as an acceptance, the Hand formula would
apply to determine if the president had reason to believe that the
plaintiff would construe his response as assent to the plaintiff's
offer. The foreseeable likelihood of loss depends on how likely it
was that the plaintiff would construe the response as assent. In this
situation, it appears that the likelihood would be high because the
language suggests assent.
The foreseeable magnitude of loss is high because the plaintiff
told the president that if he was not reemployed by January 1, he
would lose the opportunity to find alternative employment.
Accordingly, the foreseeable magnitude of loss from the president
predicating his action on the belief that the plaintiff would not
construe his planned response as an acceptance-and thus not
being more clear in his language-is the plaintiff being left
unemployed, perhaps for close to a year, depending on when the
defendant terminates the plaintiff. Also, because the president was
the offeree, there would not be as much of an opportunity to avoid
the tangible harm as there would be if the president was the
offeror, because one would not necessarily expect a response from
the plaintiff that made it clear how the plaintiff understood the
defendant's response. This is particularly true because the
president told the plaintiff to get back to work, indicating the
discussion was over. Also, if the misunderstanding was not cleared
up in a little over a week (by January 1), the tangible harm would
be done.
The burden on the president to avoid the loss would have been
small because he easily could have used language that was
unambiguous, and unlike Lucy and Leonard, there is no benefit to
being unclear in this situation. Accordingly, the burden is less than
the foreseeable likelihood of loss multiplied by the foreseeable
magnitude of loss, and the president therefore had reason to
believe his response would be construed as an acceptance.
The above cases provide just a few examples of how the Hand
formula would apply to contract rules incorporating the "reason to
know" and "reason to believe" standard. These examples
demonstrate, however, that even though the Hand formula often
does not provide determinative results, application of the three
196. Id. at 777.
197. Id.
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factors focuses attention on facts intuitively .considered relevant to
such issues. The same type of analysis could be used for any of the
Restatement rules incorporating the "reason to know" and "reason to
believe" standard, and doing so will provide for greater consistency
within the rules of contract law.
CONCLUSION

Contract law is largely a law of negligence, yet the applicable
standard of care expected of parties has not been well defined. The
Restatement implements a negligence standard primarily-though
not exclusively-through the use of a "reason to know" and
"reason to believe" standard in many of its black letter rules. The
Restatement, however, provides little guidance regarding applying
this standard, other than indicating that it is a negligence standard.
If this is so, negligence law's Hand formula should be used to
determine when a party had "reason to know" or "reason to
believe" something. The Hand formula is the accepted method for
determining whether a person is negligent under tort law, and its
utilitarian approach is arguably more suited for contract law than
tort law, because of the former's emphasis on exchange. The Hand
formula also uses factors that intuitively seem relevant to resolving
contract law issues, but which have traditionally been considered
irrelevant under contract law. And by adopting the Hand formula
as the test for when a party has "reason to know" or "reason to
believe" a fact under contract law, a vague standard will be given
greater clarity.

